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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we reply to recent comments in this Special Issue according to which subjective probability is not
considered to be a concept ﬁt for use in forensic evaluation and expert reporting. We identify the source of these
criticisms to lie in a misunderstanding of subjective probability as unconstrained subjective probability; a lack of
constraint that neither corresponds to the way in which we referred to subjective probability in our previous
contributions, nor to the way in which probability assignment is understood by current evaluative guidelines
(e.g., of ENFSI). Speciﬁcally, we explain that we understand subjective probability as a justiﬁed assertion, i.e. a
conditional assessment based on task-relevant data and information, that may be thought of as a constrained
subjective probability. This leads us to emphasise again the general conclusion that there is no gap between
justiﬁed (or, reasonable) subjective probability and other concepts of probability in terms of its ability to provide
assessments that are soundly based on whatever relevant information available. We also note that the challenges
an expert faces in reporting probabilities apply equally to all interpretations of probability, not only to subjective
probability.
1. Introduction
What started as a discussion in [37] of what, at ﬁrst sight, might
look like a simple question – is there an interval around a probability,
and hence around a likelihood ratio (Bayes factor)? – grew into a
broader exchange in this Science & Justice Virtual Special Issue, invol-
ving forensic scientists, statisticians, lawyers, psychologists and cogni-
tive scientists. This exchange was accompanied by a widening and in-
teresting enrichment of the discussion, though it also gave rise to shifts
of focus and revealed some incompatible positions. This is not sur-
prising, given the diversity of backgrounds from which the discussants
write, the diﬀerences in the nature of their respective disciplines, and
the divergent views that occur even within some of these disciplines.
It is of interest to consider the outcome of this discussion. In this,
our latest, contribution to this exchange of views, we seek to tease out
some overall concepts and summary comments that we perceive from
reading all the contributions published so far in this collection. We will
have less to say about our original discussion topic – the understanding
of probability and the likelihood ratio as a single number – because our
position follows mainly from the full subjective Bayesian theory, and it
is also acknowledged now in recent contributions to this article col-
lection [e.g., 30]. We will devote more space here, in Section 2, to
comments concerning personal, or subjective, probability that other
discussants have made in this series of papers. We analyse and discuss
eight points in turn.
• Why it is important neither to confound nor to oppose the theory (of
probability) with its application or perception (Section 2.1);
• Why it is important to properly deﬁne the scope of expert prob-
ability assertions (Section 2.2);
• Why the question of the foundations of assigned probabilities is
important to all interpretations of probability, not only to subjective
probability (Section 2.3);
• Why degrees of belief are scientiﬁc and can be empirically in-
vestigated (Section 2.4);
• Why and how any probability statement can always be re-
constructed as a subjective probability (Section 2.5);
• Why the subjective interpretation of probability is a justiﬁable
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premise (Section 2.6);
• Why existing precepts for evidential assessment are suﬃcient to
engage the entire ﬁeld of forensic science (Section 2.7).
• Why it is important to understand that the personalistic position is
also part of the concept of probabilistic modelling (Section 2.8).
Conclusions are presented in Section 3.
2. Selected discussion points
2.1. Why it is important neither to confound nor to oppose the theory (of
probability) with its application or perception
The main theme in this article collection is that of the construction
of intervals for probabilities and likelihood ratios. Consideration of this
theme requires one to ask what probability theory says on this topic.
Brieﬂy, the answer to this is that [e.g., 5,11], in their most fundamental
form (axiomatic deﬁnition), the three rules of probability, say nothing
about
• Intervals,
• Precision,
• Application of the theory,
• Assignation of probabilities.
As well as consideration, in a strict sense, of statements of the rules
of probability, we have extended our discussion to various conceptually
feasible devices for the measurement of probability, such as urn models
(to elicit indiﬀerence points) or scoring rules [25]. In combination,
these provide us with several independent routes that all lead to the
same conclusion that probability is a single number [9,12,37].
This conclusion has several implications. Of course, one is free to
say that one does not ﬁnd these deﬁnitional properties of probability
intuitive. However, it is important to keep in mind then that such a
ﬁnding is immaterial to the logic of the theory. In other words, ﬁnding
that one’s intuitive feeling or thinking about probability does not con-
form to the properties of the theory cannot be claimed to be a problem
of the theory [10]. Similarly, we do not consider arithmetic faulty
simply because we may ﬁnd it hard to accept that, for example,
2+2=4.2 The point here is that probability (theory) does not claim to
provide a description of our mindset. The theory is merely providing a
framework to help us organise our thinking in a coherent way. The es-
sential challenge thus is to ﬁnd ways for proceeding practically given
the understanding of what the theory says and does not say. Nordgaard
has clearly recognised this diﬃculty: “She might be convinced that it
can only be one probability (...) but it is harder for her to be convinced
that she actually has found it.” [31, at p. 20] We conclude from the
above that in order to avoid a misguided debate – i.e., the criticism of
the probability for something that it does not purport to do – we should
neither confound nor oppose the theory (of probability) with its ap-
plication or how it is perceived. The two topics are distinct, though
related, and the challenge for the forensic practitioner is ﬁnd ways to
apply the theory meaningfully.
2.2. Why it is important to properly deﬁne the scope of expert probability
assertions
The previous discussion point highlights the importance of properly
deﬁning the scope of an expert’s probability assertion. Also relevant for
this is the consideration that probability, at least in its interpretation as
a measure of belief, is essentially a person-related concept: probability
serves as a measure of uncertainty from an individual point of view –
but also taking account, where available, of domain-wide general
knowledge accepted across diﬀerent experts [8,35]. The assertions of a
scientist about probability thus deal with the scientiﬁc observations
within the scientist’s area of competence, and set aside other intricacies
that the legal process may entail. We emphasise this point because of a
cautionary remark formulated by Martire et al. [29] on the expression
“encapsulating all uncertainty”, introduced earlier in this Special Issue
by Berger and Slooten [5]. Martire et al. [29] write that they “(...)
question the extent to which a likelihood ratio based on personal
probabilities can realistically be expected to ‘encapsulate all un-
certainty’.” In defence of Berger and Slooten it should be emphasized
that the scope of their expression ‘all uncertainty’ relates to the in-
dividual expert's point of view, whereas Martire et al. [29] appear to
have in mind a broader perspective. In fact, in [29] they write: “(...) we
believe there is additional uncertainty to be considered.” The latter
comment reminds one of the fact that a scientist's report is not the end
of the matter. Note though that the comment should not be read as a
suggestion that individual probabilities asserted by scientists for the
scientiﬁc issues on which they are called to opine are deﬁcient.
2.3. Why the question of the foundations of assigned probabilities is
important to all interpretations of probability, not only subjective probability
The delicate intersection between, on the one hand, understanding
of the properties of probability theory (Section 2.1) and, on the other
hand, coping with this understandings in practical proceedings is well
brought to our attention by Martire et al. [29]. They clearly acknowl-
edge the reality that “(...) beliefs expressed as coherent probabilities are
neither ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ (...)” [29]. But, they then go on to note that
scientists “(...) sincerely stating subjective beliefs (...) raise problems for
courts (...)” [29] in the sense that they need to know the exact worth of
the probabilities they report. The question of trust that should be placed
in a probabilistic statement proﬀered by a scientist in a particular in-
stance is an essential element of a competent review of expert evidence
by both prosecution and defence. However, we disagree on two aspects.
The ﬁrst aspect regards the suggestion that the question of war-
rants3 for probability assertions only aﬀects subjective probabilities.
However, this is a legitimate issue for enquiry regardless of the way –
subjective or otherwise – in which scientists understand their prob-
ability statements. The real issue under discussion is not subjective
probability, but probability assignments in general.
The second aspect regards the suggestion – as we understand it
from [29], but also [30], both quoting [33] – that subjective probability
is equivalent to groundless guessing – i.e., unconstrained subjectivism.
We have repeatedly argued why this does not reﬂect our position.
Below, we thus restate and summarise a series of points that we have
hoped to have clariﬁed in our earlier contributions in this collection
(see, in particular, Section 2 in [12]):
• First and foremost, we entirely concur with the critics of subjective
probability that it is undesirable when scientists use the liberal
concept4 of probability in an arbitrary and speculative way, to make
fanciful probability statements devoid of any meaningful justiﬁca-
tion. For example, blank statements such as ‘in my opinion the
probability of observing this particular conﬁguration of minutiae,
given that the ﬁngermark has been left by an unknown ﬁnger, is so
low that it can be considered a practical impossibility’ is clearly
going above and beyond what is scientiﬁcally justiﬁable. It is an
assertion of a very small probability, rounded oﬀ to zero. In our
previous contribution [12] we have thus noted that where “(...)
2 On this point, see also Lindley in his foreword for [13].
3 This term, mentioned in [29], is widely used in the context of argument analysis
where it is understood as the provision of a justiﬁcation as to why a particular conclusion
of an argument is supported.
4 We use the expression ‘liberal concept’ here because, as mentioned in Section 2.1,
probability theory does not prescribe us how to assign a particular probability, beyond
deﬁning the range of values that a probability may take.
A. Biedermann et al. 6FLHQFH	-XVWLFH²

probabilities are given in this way, this is a cause of concern, and
[that] we would agree then with Morrison and Enzinger (...) that
such probabilities should not be held acceptable”. But, we have also
noted that this should not lead us to reject subjective probability
altogether because this would deprive us from the “(...) informed
and defensible usage of belief type probabilities (...)” [12, p. 82]. We
will have more to say about this, as it relates to the notion of ‘jus-
tiﬁed (or, constrained) subjectivism’ mentioned in title of this ar-
ticle.
• The requirement for expert probabilities to be well supported is
mentioned explicitly as a requirement in current guidelines. For
example, in its Guidance Note 3, the ENFSI Guideline for Evaluative
Reporting in Forensic Science speciﬁes [emphasis added by the au-
thors]:
“The basis for these assignments shall be documented on the case
ﬁle. Relevant and appropriate published data will be used
wherever possible. If appropriate published data are not avail-
able then data from unpublished sources may be used.
Regardless of the existence of sources (published or not) of nu-
merical data, personal data such as experience in similar cases
and peer consultations may be used, provided that the forensic
practitioner can justify the use of such data.” [16, at p. 15]
“Such personal probability assignment is not arbitrary or spec-
ulative, but is based on a body of knowledge that should be
available for auditing and disclosure. The forensic practitioner
should not mislead the recipient of expert information as to the
basis of the personal assignment, and the extent to which the
assignment is supported by scientiﬁc research.” [16, at p. 16]
The guideline also clearly states that if scientists cannot meet these
requirements, then they can provide no help in assessing probative
value:
“Note that if a likelihood ratio cannot be assigned by the for-
ensic practitioner (due to a lack of knowledge for example), then
no appropriate evaluative assessment of the ﬁndings can be
made.” [16, at p. 15]
• By subjective (or, personal) probability – the representation of an
individual’s state of knowledge (or belief state) about an uncertain
event – we mean probabilities that have been determined with the
use of transparent and coherent belief updating procedures using
any relevant data there may be [7]. This is known in (philosophical)
literature as the constraint of conditioning: the probabilities are
conditioned on relevant information (data). Hence, our subjectivism
is not unconstrained, and liable to the criticism of guesswork. Instead
it is what may be called justiﬁed subjectivism. Our subjective
probabilities are conditional probabilities and at least as data-in-
formed as any other conceptualization of probability. A valuable
feature of conditional probabilities is that they come with a clear
explanation of how they have been obtained. Thus they conform to
the ENFSI requirements mentioned above. In addition, criticism of
subjective probability that reduces probability to its potential to
permit arbitrary probability statements overlooks the potential of
this concept to encourage scientists to adopt a disciplined approach
and assume responsibility in the process of evidence evaluation.
• Interpreting probabilities as personal beliefs – i.e., subjective prob-
abilities – does notmean to refute frequency or symmetry arguments
central to other interpretations of probability. As noted by De
Finetti:
“Those interpretations of the notion of probability (...) which are
based on symmetry (the classical conception; equally likely
cases), or on frequency (the statistical conception; repeated
trials of a phenomenon), provide criteria which are also ac-
cepted and applied by subjectivists (...). It is not a question of
rejecting them, or of doing without them; the diﬀerence lies in
showing explicitly how they always need to be integrated into a
subjective judgment, and how they turn out to be (more or less
directly) applicable in particular situations.” [14, at p. 334]
Besides, there are also those cases – and there are many of them in
forensic practice (see also Section 2.7 for an example) – in which
relative frequency considerations or exchangeable events cannot be
considered. Subjective probability can cope with such cases,
whereas other interpretations of probability, namely the frequentist
view, encounter applicability problems.
In summary, thus, we insist on subjective probability being a much
more elaborate and richer concept than the alleged arbitrariness to
which its critics reduce it. In particular, justiﬁed subjectivism, as we
understand it, is based on probability that is as much informed by data
– and is required to be so by current guidelines in the profession – as
any other interpretation of probability. Further, the issue of questioning
the warrants for particular probability assignments, as mentioned by
Martire et al. [29], is a general one, aﬀecting any expert probability
assignment.
2.4. Why degrees of belief are scientiﬁc and can be empirically investigated
It is not uncommon to encounter views according to which degrees
of belief are not scientiﬁc. Again, such views may be rooted in the idea
that any superﬁcially chosen probability value could be given (i.e.,
guessing). We have argued in Section 2.3, and previously in [12], why
this is not the case. Notwithstanding that argument, recent positions in
this Special Issue reiterate the view that the subjective interpretation of
probability is incompatible with a logical and scientiﬁc approach.
Morrison, for example, writes that “The position that only a subjectivist
concept of probability is legitimate” is “(...) counterproductive for the
goal of having forensic practitioners implement, and courts not only
accept but demand, logically correct and scientiﬁcally valid evaluation
of forensic evidence” [30].5
There are two challenges in this objection, logic and scientiﬁc
character (scientism). The former is readily dealt with: subjective
probability complies with the rules of probability (i.e., the numbers that
probabilities may take and how probabilities are to be combined), and
hence is coherent. The latter requirement, scientism, requires more
consideration, though we can only mention the topic brieﬂy here. One
way to comply with the requirement of scientism is to demonstrate that
an individual’s personal beliefs can actually be measured, for mea-
surement is an essential element of science. Literature on belief mea-
surement goes back several decades already to writers such as
Savage [34] who described examples of experiments that allow one to
learn about the subjective probabilities held by individuals. The basic
idea of the proposed techniques for measuring degrees of belief involves
a consideration of the bets that a person is willing to accept. We are not
suggesting here that forensic practice should become a betting exercise,
a point that we have also made in our previous discussion on scoring
rules for probability assessment in a decision-theoretic perspec-
tive [12]. We are only making the conceptual point that – in principle –
personal beliefs are not something abstract or imaginary: personal be-
liefs can actually be empirically investigated.
The fact that an individual’s beliefs are accessible for empirical in-
vestigation should be of particular interest to the (forensic) cognitive sci-
entists and psychologists involved in this discussion.6 In this context, we
ﬁnd it relevant to note and worthy of a moment of reﬂection that statis-
ticians, too, have made this observation. Lindley, for example, wrote:
5 We have never claimed that ‘only’ subjective probability is legitimate. We have only
noted that all other interpretations are less comprehensive and encounter more limita-
tions, mainly regarding applicability [8]. See also Section 2.6 for further discussion on
this point.
6 See [39] for examples on the study of expert probability assignment.
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“My view is that the most important statistical research topic as we
enter the new millennium is the development of sensible methods of
probability assessment. This will require co-operation with nu-
merate experimental psychologists and much experimental work. A
colleague put it neatly, though with some exaggeration: ‘There are
no problems left in statistics except the assessment of probability’. It
is curious that the typical expert in probability knows nothing about,
and has no interest in, assessment.” [27, at p. 318]
2.5. Why and how any probability statement can always be reconstructed as
a subjective probability
All statistical conclusions are obviously conditional on stated as-
sumptions, and this is valid also for frequentist procedures, that are not
dispensed from subjective choices such as the hypotheses of interest,
the statistical model and so on. In his latest contribution to this article
collection, Morrison [30] advocates a procedure by which all subjective
elements – concerning what he calls ‘pre-empirical matters’ (e.g., choice
of hypotheses, selection of data) – are separated from the purely tech-
nical procedure designed to work out probabilities (or, probability
densities) in the numerator and denominator of the likelihood ratio.
The result is an abstract procedure whose “(...) output (...) is reported as
the strength of evidence statement” [30]. By adding that “(...) such
procedures do not involve additional subjective judgement” [30] the
stated goal is to work towards ‘maximising objectivity’. Although this
procedure is transparent with respect to what it is doing, the determi-
nation of the probabilities for the evaluation of the strength of evidence
in this way raises the following interesting question:
What do such probabilities mean?7
Morrison replies only indirectly to this question by stating that the
“(...) proposed solution does not require the forensic practitioner to
adopt a subjectivist concept of probability” [30].
We caution against Morrison’s statement because it suggests that
one can choose the kind of probability that one is using or, stated
otherwise, actively decide that one’s probability has nothing to do with
subjectivism. Our position is to say that the contrary is actually true. As
noted in our last contribution [12], the scientist will need to decide on
the probabilities, if any, that he will report and retain for the de-
termination of the strength of evidence (i.e., probabilities that make up
a likelihood ratio). The reported probabilities may be derived by any
legitimate procedure, including those advocated by Morrison. But when
it comes to discussing the meaning of the probability or likelihood ratio
that is reported, the subjectivist position becomes inevitable.
For the single number that the scientist decides to report – re-
presenting the probability assigned for an uncertain event of interest8 –
it is always possible to explain this number with respect to a standard
for probability, such as the proportion of balls in an urn that are of a
certain colour [e.g., 28]. For example, if the scientist asserts that their
probability for the evidence, given the prosecution’s proposition and
the relevant information available, is 0.01, we can reconstruct this
probability – conceptually – as the scientist’s personal point of in-
diﬀerence with respect to the event of successfully drawing9 of a red
ball from an urn composed of 1 red ball and 99 white balls: the two
events, the evidence and the selection of a red ball, are considered
equally uncertain. Again, as noted in Section 2.4, there is no suggestion
in our argument that probability assignments in forensic science should
be turned into a gambling exercise. We are only pointing out what,
conceptually, a given single reported probability means; there would be
no hope of making sense out of the complexities and case-speciﬁc cir-
cumstances of real world forensic cases if we were not able to tell, in
principle, how the nature of a reported probability is (to be) under-
stood.
2.6. Why the subjective interpretation of probability is a justiﬁable premise
In Section 2.5 we have explained why the subjective interpretation
of probability is essential when it comes to explaining what a particular
expert probability assertion means. The interpretation of probability as
an individual’s personal belief receives, however, ongoing challenge.
Morrison notes:
“Personally, I ﬁnd the arguments of Biedermann et al. to be un-
convincing because those arguments are based on a premise which a
priori I believe to be false, and they have presented no evidence
which has convinced me otherwise. The premise is that only a
subjectivist concept of probability is legitimate. Under this premise,
probability is a state of mind, not a state of nature.” [30]
Our reply to this is, ﬁrst, that the choice of the subjectivist inter-
pretation of probability does not reduce to a mere question of premise.
In particular, our premise is not ‘only a subjectivist concept of prob-
ability is legitimate’. In fact, the contrary is true: our starting point is to
say that one is entirely free in the choice of one’s interpretation of
probability, but one ought to be able to cope with the implications of
the interpretation that one has chosen. Thus, when we say that we
choose the subjectivist interpretation of probability, we do so because
all other interpretations we know of run into diﬃculties of various
kinds that we want to avoid.
Within the limited scope available in this paper, consider brieﬂy the
following two alternative interpretations (see [8] for more detailed
discussion): the frequentist interpretation and the classical deﬁnition
following the works of Pierre-Simon Laplace. In the general context of
the law, it has long been understood that, most of the time, the fre-
quentist interpretation of probability does not work, or is meaningless.
Almost half a century ago, Kaplan noted: “Given a typical contested
trial, for instance, it is meaningless to speak of the probability of the
defendant's guilt in terms of the number of times he would be guilty in
an inﬁnite number of exactly similar cases (...)” [23, at p. 1066] Si-
milarly, Lindley has noted: “There is nothing wrong with the frequency
interpretation, or chance. It has not been used in this treatment because
it is often useless. What is the chance that the defendant is guilty?” [26,
at p. 48] Frequentist probabilities, thus, are not meaningful for con-
sideration of the probability of legal hypotheses. However, there can be
a role for their use in the determination of likelihood ratios. For ex-
ample, frequentist ideas may be used when prior parameters in the
Bayesian calculations involved in the determination of a likelihood
ratio are estimated from appropriate databases. Frequentist ideas may
then be integrated into a subjective judgement, as noted towards the
end of Section 2.3, especially with reference to the quote of De Finetti
[14, at p. 334]. In this perspective, frequentist ideas may help in the
assignation of probabilities, but not uniquely so – only as one con-
sideration among others. Note, however, that care is required because
many of the controversial issues discussed through this Special Issue,
and the wider forensic practice [36], are actually problems that derive
from adherence to frequentist concepts.
The second candidate interpretation, the classical deﬁnition, is
based on the assumption of ‘equally probable cases’, a concept for
which no independent deﬁnition is given. This makes this interpreta-
tion circular, which is why it is not pursued further.
Our second line of reply to Morrison's skepticism is that, more
generally, the judgement of probability interpretations is not a
straightforward task because it raises the question of how to specify
criteria for the judgment of the adequacy of an interpretation of
probability. The criterion of applicability is one example and we have
brieﬂy mentioned above why the frequentist interpretation does not
7 For an insightful discussion of this question, see also [4].
8 We note that this also holds for conditional probabilities as used in a likelihood ratio.
9 We insist on the point that no repetition (and hence frequentist idea) is involved in
this concept. The ball is to be drawn once and once only, with the outcome (and its
probability) depending only on the proportion (composition of the urn).
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always meet this requirement. But the question of how to make a
transition from probability in its uninterpreted form to subjective
probability touches on the more fundamental issue of how to view
mathematics. One relevant perspective in our context of discussion is
the so-called intuitionist-constructive attitude. It says that mathematics
is a formal language with every concept, starting with the most basic
concepts, having a precise meaning. In this perspective, subjective
probability is not a function on a space of sets, as in Kolmogorov's ax-
ioms, but rather a price assessed for speciﬁc economic transactions
depending on the truth or otherwise of the event assessed [e.g., 24].
This brings us back to the point that we have made earlier in
Section 2.5: subjective probability satisﬁes an operational deﬁnition. It
is operational in the sense that it allows us to render explicit the per-
sonal views of a person, which are otherwise not directly observable,
contemplating aspects of the real world.
In summary, we conclude that a commitment to the subjective in-
terpretation of probability is not a deliberate choice. It is the result of
analyzing diﬀerent concepts of probability and then ﬁnding that con-
strained (or ‘justiﬁed’ as we call it in this paper) subjective probability
represents advantages over other interpretations that may run into
applicability problems. Avoiding such applicability problems is im-
portant because they are one reason why probabilism in forensic sci-
ence and the law has received, and continues to receive, much criticism.
Even strong challengers of probability concepts among legal scholars
consider that subjective probability is the least problematic perspective:
“None of the conceptualizations of probability except probability as
subjective degrees of belief can function at trial.” [2, at p.104]10
2.7. Why existing precepts for evidential assessment are suﬃcient for
keeping the entire ﬁeld of forensic science engaged
Over the past few decades, several parts of the scientiﬁc and legal
literature converged in their opinions that scientiﬁc evidence should be
evaluated in a balanced, transparent, value-adding, robust and logical
way [e.g., 22].11 These are general criteria, formulated independently
from particular forms of scientiﬁc evidence and speciﬁc procedural
prescriptions that may vary across diﬀerent legal systems. The idea
behind these criteria is to focus on how scientists can be supported in
their sound reasoning about scientiﬁc evidence, but recognising that
the question of how evidence should actually be presented at trial is a
diﬀerent issue on its own (see, e.g., Redmayne [32] on what he calls the
‘presentation problem’). It has been gradually recognised, and agreed,
that the scientist can work towards meeting the above criteria, espe-
cially logic and balance, if his thinking is directed towards answering
the questions that, formally, lead to the numerator and denominator of
the likelihood ratio: what is the probability of the scientist's results if
one proposition for the event of interest is true rather than if an alter-
native proposition is true?
In his latest discussion paper, Morrison [30] proposes his own cri-
teria for evidential assessment:
“In considering what would be the best approach for evaluating
strength of evidence, I suggest that the desiderata be (1) to maximise
empirically demonstrable performance; (2) to maximise objectivity
in the sense of maximising transparency and replicability, and
minimising the potential for cognitive bias; and (3) to constrain and
make overt the forensic practitioner's subjective-judgement based
decisions so that the appropriateness of those decisions can be de-
bated before the judge in an admissibility hearing and/or before the
trier of fact at trial." [30]
Implicit in this proposal is the assignment of a likelihood ratio, a
purpose that is already covered by the above mentioned existing cri-
teria, though Morrison's desiderata may be seen as providing a more
explicit statement not only of the goals, but also of the way in which
they ought to be realised, and of the technical properties to which the
resulting expressions of probative value should conform. Among these
properties is the notion of ‘empirical demonstrable performance’. On
this notion, we make two comments.
First, the feature of demonstrability can be seen as being part of the
existing criteria, mainly robustness. In its broadest sense, robustness is a
criterion that challenges a scientist's ability to explain the grounds for
his opinion, together with his degree of understanding of the particular
evidence type [22], asking him to convey a clear idea of the reasons
that he believes entitle him to arrive at the stated conclusions. Jackson
has noted:
“(...) the scientist is directed to challenge the available data and to
use it in an expert way. If there is limited data, this should be re-
ﬂected in the evaluation of the strength of the evidence. The ap-
proach not only helps guard against overstating the value of evi-
dence but also assists obtaining maximum value from the evidence.”
[22, p. 85]
Second, the goal of empirical demonstrability is laudable and may
work well in areas of forensic science, especially Morrison's speciality of
comparative analyses of speech, where ample potential exists for con-
ducting case-tailored experiments (and the production of scores) under
controlled conditions. However, this does not correspond to the starting
point of many areas of forensic science. A practical example helps to
illustrate this point. Consider the case R v George [15]. The main sci-
entiﬁc ﬁnding in this case was a single gunshot residue particle from the
internal right pocket of the coat of Mr George, found hanging on the
kitchen door of his ﬂat, one year after killing (i.e., single shot to the
head of the victim). The following text is a section of one of the sci-
entiﬁc reports, given as a direct quote in the judgment (note that FDR is
short for ﬁrearm discharge residue; bold underline as in original):
“Conclusion
The signiﬁcance of the FDR ﬁndings in this case can be put into
context by considering two alternative propositions:
Mr George is the man who shot Ms Dando.
Mr George had nothing to do with the incident.
In our opinion the probability of ﬁnding a single particle of dis-
charge residue in Mr George's coat pocket would have been the
same, regardless of which of the above propositions was true.
The FDR evidence is thus inconclusive. In our opinion it pro-
vides no assistance to anyone asked to judge which proposition
is true.” [15, par. 23]
The scientists gave here their probabilities for the ﬁnding given each
of the two propositions: they said they consider the two probabilities to
be the same, meaning that their likelihood ratio was 1. Clearly, there is
no such thing here as an empirical demonstration of their opinion,
because it would not feasible. For obvious time and monetary con-
straints, one cannot reasonably set up controlled experiments of
shootings and then wait, in each experiment, one year – because this is
an essential feature of the circumstances of the case at hand – to see
how much FDR would be found in the pocket. What the experts do is
ask the pertinent questions: the probability of the ﬁnding, given each of
the two propositions of interest. The question is put to experts because
they are considered more knowledgable about the particular trace type
– here, FDR formation, transfer, persistence and background (on
clothing) – than laypersons and the court. There may be debate about
whether scientists should be allowed to bring this speciﬁc knowledge of
trace type into the process. But two points need to be kept in mind.
First, if experts’ accounts are not admitted, then there is no better
person left to testify on the FDR ﬁnding. Second, if the experts’ accounts
are admitted, the relevant questions we want them to consider are still
10 On the same view, see also [17].
11 These criteria are also mentioned in Guidance Note 1 of the ENFSI Guideline [16],
and previously in documents issued by the Assocation of Forensic Science Providers [3]
and the Royal Statistical Society's Working Group on Statistics and the Law [1].
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those mentioned above, because they ensure balance, transparency and
logic. Conceptually, though experts’ specialised knowledge is in-
complete, at least to some degree, on practical matters this in-
completeness is made formally – and hence scientiﬁcally – precise by
probability. Note however, that only the subjective interpretation of
probability works in this case; the frequentist interpretation would not
work. Moreover, the paucity of the data will remain the same, whatever
perspective regarding probability is taken.
As can be seen, Morrison’s desiderata would encounter applicability
problems in the above example, and it would be detrimental to the ﬁeld
of FDR analysis if this impasse would be used as an argument against
the ﬁeld's pursuit of the general logical framework of evaluative pre-
cepts that we have mentioned at the beginning of this section. This risk
is real, especially in the area of FDR analysis (see [18] for a discussion).
If our intention is to keep the whole ﬁeld of forensic science on track
towards the implementation of the principles of logical evaluative
reasoning – which is dependent on asking the pertinent questions in the
ﬁrst place – the general and established precepts for evidential assess-
ment [1,3,16,22] pose a feasible and realistic level of challenge.
With our above two comments we do not seek to advise against
empiricism. Investigating the properties of likelihood ratios is insightful
and valuable, but it may be done in many ways (see also [38] in this
Special Issue) and this can be considered, and should be encouraged, as
being part of the established criterion of robustness. We also do not
intend to give a pass to ‘bad science’. We are only arguing that there are
branches of forensic science, and cases with peculiar circumstances
(especially not replicable events), where the robustness and the foun-
dations of scientists’ evaluations require other forms of probing than
what Morrison’s desiderata suggest, though posing possibly higher
challenges to both scientists and cross-examiners.
2.8. Why it is important to understand that the personalistic position is also
part of the concept of probabilistic modelling
For the most part in this paper we have focused attention on the
nature and inevitability of probability to be understood as a personal
assessment. In many instances, probabilities are assigned through a
formal model, involving one or more parameters for which, too, the
scientist needs to specify probability distributions. So again, we see that
the scientist has an active role in the process of probabilistic modelling.
In our previous papers in this Special Issue we have not addressed, for
example, the particular aspect of eliciting prior distributions for para-
meters. Morrison [30] approaches this topic in his last contribution.
Clearly, any statistical procedure is characterized by subjective ele-
ments, such as the choice of hypotheses, model assumptions, and also
the choice of prior distributions for model parameters. It is well un-
derstood that, given available data, hypotheses and model assumptions,
a change in a prior distribution may lead to appreciable changes in the
output, which may be the value of a likelihood ratio or the distribution
of a parameter of interest. This is an important topic known as sensi-
tivity analysis, however, it was not our main focus of attention. Mor-
rison's latest proposal goes into the direction of ‘objectifying’ a Bayesian
solution with the aim of avoiding informative prior distributions as they
may be felt too arbitrary and hence not useful (or justiﬁable) in a legal
setting. This touches on yet another topic we did not pursue, the
aversion to priors. This topic is dealt with extensively elsewhere in
existing literature (see, for example, Bernardo [6] and related literature
for a discussion about reference analysis). We underline, however, that
subjectivism is unavoidable once we embrace the Bayesian paradigm
that is characterized by an interpretation of probability as a rational,
conditional measure of uncertainty. Each element in a Bayesian ana-
lysis, including prior information, has a well-deﬁned role and trying to
eliminate any element would mean to misconceive what the theory is
actually trying to achieve. As noted by Howson [21]: “(...) to deliber-
ately suppress it [prior information] in a theory which gives it an ex-
plicit role is perverse (....)” [p. 56].
3. Conclusions
We have come to a strange point in this discussion. On the one hand,
all discussants accept that probability is the appropriate scientiﬁc way
to quantify incomplete knowledge or uncertainty. On the other hand,
there are fundamental disagreements about how a forensic expert's
assertion of probability may be understood. These disagreements do not
help to strengthen the perception of the trustworthiness of forensic
science. They do not help either to further the roles of science [20] and
probability [8] in forensic practice. Yet we see room for a reconciling
perspective: the perspective is that all discussants pursue the idea that
we should make the best use of relevant data. Diﬀerences arise only
over the question of how exactly this ought to be done:
• Proponents favouring a strong empiricist or frequentist perspective
use data exclusively to deﬁne probability – with the consequence of
not being able to give a probability in situations that cannot
meaningfully be reconstructed in an experimental way. In short this
position says, no probability – or, ‘I don’t know what the probability
is’ – without data.
• This is diﬀerent for supporters of subjective probabilism whose
probability can always be given (including for single, not repeatable
events), for it would not make sense for them to say that they do not
know their own mind, nor that they do not know what their prob-
ability is. Subjective probability is as much informed by data as
other types of probability, but it is not deﬁned by that data. The data
only informs, or conditions, an expert’s probability.
Considering the challenges posed on a practical and operational
account, the issue of warrant is particularly noteworthy [29]. As we
have argued, however, warrants for probability assertions do not con-
cern only subjective probability, but all types of probabilities conveyed
by scientists. Thus, recipients of expert information should always
probe the foundations of any probabilities asserted by scientists.
A further conclusion that may be drawn is the need to be precise
regarding the terminology and deﬁnition of concepts. For example,
many standard criticisms levelled against subjectivism invoke the no-
tion of guesswork: given the fact that subjective probabilities purport to
represent an individual’s personal beliefs which, by deﬁnition, can take
any value, it is argued that subjective probabilities run the risk of being
aleatory, fanciful, speculative or otherwise unsound. However, the
discussion is not about so-called unconstrained subjective probabilities;
that would indeed be discomforting. As noted above, the concept we
have in mind is of constrained subjective probability. Probabilities of
this type, conditioned on task-relevant data, are also required by cur-
rent evaluative guidelines [16].
A generally skeptical position is taken by Morrison [30] who con-
tends that “[i]nsisting that forensic practitioners adopt a subjectivist
concept of probability (...) is not helpful" and, on another occasion, “is
counterproductive”. Our principal reply (Section 2.5) to this is that
subjective probability is not a question of insistence, but of inevit-
ability, and it would be unscientiﬁc actively to ignore this reality.
Further, we emphasize that such scepticism should not be interpreted as
a suggestion that subjective probabilities lack foundations. As noted in
Section 2.4, subjective probabilities are, of course, logical (i.e., in
agreement with the rules of probability calculus) and scientiﬁc (i.e.,
measurable).
While no one is able to tell scientists what their subjective prob-
abilities ought to be, clariﬁcation can be given as to the consequences of
their choices. Ultimately, the probability that a scientist will retain in
his reporting – in whatever way it was worked out and its nature is
understood – can be seen as a decision [9,12], highlighting the idea that
the reported probability represents the answer judged most appropriate
– conditioned on all task-relevant information, domain knowledge and
background data – that the scientist can give in reply to the uncertainty
to be assessed. Understanding expert probability reporting as a decision
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to be made by the scientist has the additional advantage of encouraging
scientists to make up their minds seriously, and assume responsibility
for the assignments they will convey. As in probability theory, we
cannot require all discussants to share the same probability in actual
tasks requiring probability assignments, though it appears fair to re-
quire all discussants to have reasonable (i.e., justiﬁed) prob-
abilities [19]. Broad agreement on this is demonstrated in this Special
Issue by the fact that there is ample exchange on probability assign-
ment, which also demonstrates that discussants take this task seriously
and actually want their probabilities to be well supported.
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